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[1] 反思台湾的（人文及社会）高教学术评鉴研讨会（2004.9.25~26）。

[2] 对学术「机构」之评鉴，主要也是以对「人」的评鉴为基础。

[3] “Commodities are here empirically defined as objects produced for sale on the market; markets, again, are empirically defined as actual contracts between buyers and sellers. Accordingly, every element of industry is regarded as having been produced for sale, as then and then only will it be subject to the supply-and-demand mechanism interacting with price.” (Polanyi, 1944/1957, p.72)

[4] 本节详参考：黄世鑫（2002）。

[5] “Modern philosophy of science grew out of a movement called logical positivism, which emerged in the early twentieth century. … Logical positivism as a movement was essentially Germanic in its inception, growing out of evening meeting of the Vienna Circle. … The logical positivist program was dedicated to clarity, rigor, and attention to detail. Many of the logical positivists believed that all significant problems could and should be reducible to problems formalizable in logic. In addition, they aimed to form an Einheitswissenschaft, an all-encompassing science jointed by one method: the logical method of analysis. The assumed that science is rational and progressive. The spreading of science meant, in their view, extending rationality to the culture.” (Redman, 1993, p. 8).

[6] Blatt (1983)是位数学家，其严厉批判经济学者在纯经济理论（pure economic theory）和计量模型如何「误用」数学。

[7] “The objection here is not to the use of mathematics – or even to the mathematicization of economics. It is rather to the misuse that has been made of mathematics in economics – and in particular to the way mathematics has been used to give a pseudoscientific façade to a body of theory which can meet none of the empirical tests by which science is distinguished from mere superstition or crude ideology.” (Eichner, 1983c, p. 231).

[8] “This reformulation of economics – actually translation of theory into mathematic language – was to have a number of important consequences, not the least of which was to make economics appear to be more scientific. ….. Whatever the reason, the effect on economics as a discipline has been disastrous.” (Eichner, 1983c, p. 229).

“Neoclassicism is not just irrelevant because it is based on unrealistic assumptions and tenuously long threads of deductive reasoning. Rather than just being irrelevant, it is pernicious. Would that it were only irrelevant then it would be ignored. But, in a very real sense, it is perfectly relevant – as a justification and rationalization of continued inequality, that is.” (Dugger and Sherman, 1998, p. 215)

[9]十八世纪后半，欧洲的政治经济学存在二大典范之竞争，即德国历史学派与英国边际效用学派；十八世纪末初期美国的政治经济学者，大部份向往德国留学，承袭德国历史学派，在1890年代初达到高峰，至1900年代走下坡（至1910年几乎完全终止），转向英国。故最初，德国历史学派在美国各大学享有相当大的影响力；例如1886年American Economic Association即由留学德国代表历史学派John Hopkins大学的Richard T. Ely 所创立。但在1880至1890年代间，美国的经济学者之政策主张与大企业家的利益相冲突，而这些大企业家却是各大学的主要资助者；拥护讲学自由（Lehrfreiheit）的Ely和其学生所遭受的影响最大，Ely因而未能获得终身职而离开John Hopkins大学；其死对头，对政治经济学看法倾向Jevons的数学家Simon Newcomb，在论争中，赢得胜利（Redman, 1993, pp. 154~155）。

[10] 对照我国，此种影响更为深远、根深柢固。

[11] Harry G. Johnson, The American Tradition in Economics, in: Nebraska Journal of Economics, 1977, vol. 16, pp. 17~26; 引自：Redman (1993), p. 156.

[12] Boulding所称，其内涵如：”Usually, economic theorizing employs the economic model of behaviour, ‘homo economicus’, assuming that individuals (economic agents) are self-interested rationally acting utility maximizers. This is first of all assumed to hold for all individuals acting in markets. On the contrary, when analysing behaviour in nonmarket decision situations, traditional economic theory used other assumptions, such as benevolent or altruistic behaviour. …. During recent decades, however, economic theory became imperialistic, as more and more areas of human behaviour were analysed using the economic model.” (Kirchgässner, 1999, p.14)。

[13] “Indeed, institutional economists, unlike positive economists, are convinced that as social scientists committed to certain values they have a responsibility to indicate when and in which way socio-economic processes may endanger human values and human life.”(Kapp, 1968,p.11).